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ABSTRACT
This report presents a review and comparison (commonality and 
differences) of three cross-sector cyber security standards and an 
internationally recognized information technology standard. The 
comparison identifies the security areas covered by each standard and 
reveals where the standards differ in emphasis. By identifying differences 
in the standards, the user can evaluate which standard best meets their 
needs. For this report, only cross-sector standards were reviewed. 
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1A Comparison of Cross-Sector 
Cyber Security Standards 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This report compares three cross-sector cyber security documents developed for critical 
infrastructures to a widely recognized information security international standard (International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO)/International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 17799). 
The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) coordinated with the Department of Energy’s Critical 
Infrastructure Security Standards Working Group and academic partners at the University of 
Idaho to produce this report. Although these three documents are not standards, they do provide 
sound guidance in providing cyber security to control systems in the industry. 
“Critical infrastructures rely upon physical and cyber-based systems for their daily 
operations. They include, but are not limited to, telecommunications, energy, banking and 
finance, transportation, water systems and emergency services, both governmental and private. 
Many of the nation’s critical infrastructures have historically been physically and logically 
separate systems that had little interdependence. As a result of advances in information 
technology and the necessity of improved efficiency, however, these infrastructures have become 
increasingly automated and interlinked. These same advances have created new vulnerabilities to 
equipment failure, human error, weather and other natural causes, and physical and cyber 
attacks. Addressing these vulnerabilities will necessarily require flexible, evolutionary 
approaches that span both the public and private sectors, and protect both domestic and 
international security.”1
These critical infrastructures are composed of public and private institutions. Cyberspace is 
their “nervous system—the control system of our country.”2
“Cyber attacks may target data or control systems. The first type attempts to steal or 
corrupt data and deny services. The vast majority of Internet and other computer attacks have 
fallen into this category, such as credit-card number theft, Web site vandalism and the occasional 
major denial-of-service assault.”3
“Control-system attacks attempt to disable or take power over operations used to maintain 
physical infrastructure, such as distributed control systems that regulate water supplies, electrical 
transmission networks and railroads. While remote access to many control systems have 
previously required an attacker to dial in with a modem, these operations are increasingly using 
the Internet to transmit data or are connected to a company’s local network—a system protected 
with firewalls that, in some cases, could be penetrated.” 3
These cyber security measures, whether in the form of standards, guidelines, best practices, 
or technical reports (hereafter broadly referred to as standards), when followed, can provide 
increased security to control systems. There are distinct differences in the topics considered by 
the three documents (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST] Process Control 
Security Requirements Forum [PCSRF] Industrial Control Systems [ICS] System Protection 
2Profile [SPP], Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society [ISA] Technical Report 99-1 
[TR99-01], and ISA Technical Report 99-2 [TR99-02]) considered in this report. There are also 
differences in the format. The ICS-SPP is written in the Common Criteria format and is 
Normative in nature, while the ISA Technical Reports are written in plain text and are 
informative in nature. The objective of this report is to promote an understanding of cyber 
security issues and promote identification and use of the applicable control system security 
standards and guidelines for specific areas of concern.  
This report compares the three cyber security standards developed for the protection of 
critical infrastructures, using ISO/IEC 17799 standard as a comparison. ISO/IEC 17799 was 
established as a Cyber Security Standard in 1995 and finally issued in 2000. Although there are 
other standards that address control system cyber security, many use ISO/IEC 17799 as the base, 
or starting point, for cyber security standards.
32. PROBLEM 
Much of the critical infrastructure in the United States may be at risk due to increasing 
cyber intrusions that can impact normal operations. Many of the critical infrastructure sectors 
depend on control systems for their operation. The President of the United States issued 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)–7 on December 17, 2003, which stated in 
part, “it is the policy of the United States to enhance the protection of our Nation’s critical 
infrastructure.”4 In addition, HSPD-7 states, “The Department and Sector-Specific Agencies will 
collaborate with appropriate private sector entities and continue to encourage the development of 
information sharing and analysis mechanisms.” The HSPD-7 directs that the Department of 
Commerce, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, will work with private 
sector, research, academic, and government organizations to improve technology for cyber 
systems and promote other critical infrastructure efforts, including using its authority under the 
Defense Production Act to ensure the timely availability of industrial products, materials, and 
services to meet homeland security requirements. 
Physical and cyber attacks are increasing against the control systems used in our critical 
infrastructures.5 Physical attacks are very visible to the public and industry. There is usually 
property damage or personal injury involved with the physical attack and the news media will 
publicize the event. Cyber attacks, on the other hand, are not as easily identified and many 
companies do not report the events or publicize their cyber vulnerabilities. Many of the cyber 
attacks may go unnoticed for long periods of time. Further, resources and tools for cyber attacks 
are becoming more commonplace and readily available. In order to combat these intrusions, both 
ISA and NIST have documented cyber security measures.  
Electronic intrusions and attacks may come from both inside and outside a company. From 
within, intrusions may be innocent mistakes made by an operator, or deliberate attacks by 
disgruntled employees. Externally, intrusions come from former employees, computer viruses, 
and from hostile external attackers. Many companies have Internet connections to the control 
system to enable management, engineering, and others to monitor processes and progress. 
Vulnerability to the intrusions and attacks has increased with access to the control systems 
through the Internet. HSPD-7 states, “While it is not possible to protect or eliminate the 
vulnerability of all critical infrastructure … strategic improvements in security can make it more 
difficult for attacks to succeed and can lessen the impact of attacks that may occur.”4 Cyber 
intrusions can be costly to industries, and many can be thwarted by the proper application of 
cyber security standards.a
Cyber security standards can be used to help identify problems and reduce the 
vulnerabilities in a control system. By knowing the problems and vulnerabilities, standards can 
be applied to control systems and to minimize the risk of intrusion. This report presents a 
comparison of three cyber security standards developed for industrial control systems. Because 
there are differences in these standards, a careful examination of this comparison and the 
standards should be made, based on individual needs, before applying this information. 
a.  A similar study considered standards in the electrical industries. 
4Implementing the proper standard for a particular industry’s application can reduce 
vulnerabilities in control systems. 
53. STANDARDS 
This section provides a brief description of an international information security standard 
and the three other standards used in this study. Table 1 shows the major sections of each 
standard. This study can help identify the similarities and differences between standards, which 
can contribute to selecting the best security practices and help strengthen sections of the 
standards in future revisions. Care should be taken in applying this information, as there are 
differences in the emphases of each of the standards. 
3.1 ISO/IEC 17799. Information Technology – Code of Practice for 
Information Security Management 
ISO/IEC 17799, First edition 2000-12-01, standard titled, “Information Technology – Code 
of Practice for Information Security Management,” gives recommendations for information 
security management. It is high level, broad in scope, conceptual in nature, and intended to 
provide a basis for an organization to develop its own organizational security standards and 
security management practices.6
The standard states: “This code of practice may be regarded as a starting point in 
developing organization-specific guidance. Not all of the guidance and controls in the code of 
practice may be applicable. Furthermore, additional control not included in this document may 
be required.”7
ISO/IEC 17799 is a widely recognized, comprehensive information security standard. It is 
organized into ten major sections or topics. The sections are listed in Table 1, along with the 
major sections from the other standards covered in this report. Although it was not written 
specifically for the oil and gas sector, ISO/IEC 17799 offers guidelines and voluntary directions 
for information security management and is meant to provide a general description of the areas 
considered important when initiating, implementing, or maintaining information security in an 
organization. It addresses the topics in terms of policies and general good practices but does not 
provide definitive details or “how-tos.”8
3.2 NIST PCSRF – Security Capabilities Profile 
for Industrial Control Systems  
The Process Control Securities Requirements Forum (PCSRF) has prepared a System 
Protection Profile (SPP) to formally state security requirements associated with industrial control 
systems (ICS). This document discusses security issues and capabilities relevant to those 
regarded as components of the national critical information infrastructure. The document defines 
security capabilities that would exist in electronic programmable components that comprise an 
industrial control system.9
The document directs users to review the “Common Criteria” document for further 
guidance in securing control systems. The SPP has been written in such a way that it may be 
used as the basis for preparing a System Security Target for a specific ICS, or it may be used as 
6the basis for a more detailed SPP for a sub-class of ICS, such as a Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition System (SCADA). 
3.3 ISA SP99 – Manufacturing and 
Control System Security Standard 
The focus of the ISA-SP99 committee is to improve the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of components or systems used for manufacturing or control and provide criteria for 
procuring and implementing secure control systems. To date, the committee has issued two 
technical reports dealing with control system security.10
The ISA TR99 technical reports incorporate a great deal of information from other security 
standards and publications and add information specific to control systems. These technical 
reports are useful for identifying issues to consider and security options. They are not standards 
with well defined requirements that can be tested, certified, or included in proposals.11
3.3.1 ISA-TR99.00.01-2004 - Security Technologies of Manufacturing and 
Control Systems
The ISA Technical Report, “Security Technologies of Manufacturing and Control 
Systems” (TR99-01) provides recommendations and guidance for effectively using electronic 
security technology and developing a site or corporate security program and plan for the 
manufacturing and control systems environment.  
ISA TR99-01 provides an evaluation and assessment of current types of electronic security 
technologies and tools that apply to the manufacturing and control systems environment 
(including development, implementation, operations, maintenance, engineering, and other user 
services). It provides guidance to manufacturers, vendors, and security practitioners at end-user 
companies on the technological options for securing these systems against cyber attack. It deals 
with analyzing technologies and determining applicability to securing the manufacturing and 
control systems environment. 
It also provides a current assessment of security tools and technologies that apply to the 
manufacturing and control systems environment and describes several categories of security 
technologies, the types of products available in those categories, the pros and cons of using those 
products in the manufacturing and control systems environment relative to expected threats and 
known vulnerabilities, along with preliminary recommendations and guidance for using those 
security technologies.12
3.3.2 ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 - Integrating Electronic Security into the 
Manufacturing and Control System Environment
ISA Technical Report, “Integrating Electronic Security into the Manufacturing and Control 
System Environment,” (TR99-02) provides recommendations and guidance for effectively using 
electronic security technology and developing a site or corporate security program and plan for 
the manufacturing and control systems environment. It provides a framework for developing an 
7electronic security program and a recommended organization and structure for the security plan. 
Detailed information is provided about the minimum elements to include and where specific 
information should be included in the program. 
The concept of manufacturing and control systems cyber security, as addressed in TR99-
02, is applied in the broadest practical sense, encompassing all types of plants, facilities, and 
systems in all industries. Included are hardware and software systems such as Distributed 
Control Systems (DCSs); Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), and Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. The technical report also addresses networked electronic 
sensing and monitoring and diagnostic systems associated internal, human, network, or machine 
interfaces and Basic Process Control System (BPCS), Safety Instrumented System (SIS), and 
associated systems.13
8Table 1. Major sections in cross-sector developed cyber security standards. 
ISO/IEC 17799 
Information 
Technology- Code of 
Practice for Information 
Security Management 
NIST PCSRF 
System Protection 
Profile – Industrial 
Control System –  
SPP-ICS
ISA-TR99.00.01-2004 
Security Technologies of 
Manufacturing and 
Control Systems 
ISA-TR99.00.02-2004 
Integrating Electronic 
Security into the 
Manufacturing and Control 
System Environment 
82 pages  151 pages 80 pages 87 pages 
Security Policy  STOE (System Target of 
Evaluation) Description 
Authentication and 
Authorization 
Technologies 
Developing a Security 
Program 
Organizational Security  STOE Security 
Environment 
Filtering/Blocking/ 
Access Control 
Technologies 
Define Risk Goals 
Asset Classification and 
Control 
Risks Encryption Technologies 
and Data Validation 
Assess and Define Existing 
System 
Personnel Security  Security Objectives Audit, Measurement, 
Monitoring, and 
Detection Tools 
Conduct Risk Assessment 
and Gap Analysis 
Physical and 
Environmental Security 
IT (Information 
Technology) Security 
Requirements 
Computer Software Design of Select 
Countermeasures 
Network Design and 
Data Interchange 
SPP Application Notes Physical Security 
Controls 
Procure or Build 
Countermeasures 
Communications and 
Operations 
Management 
Rational  Define Component Test 
Plans
Access Control    Test Countermeasures 
Systems Development 
and Maintenance 
  Define Integrated Test Plan 
Business Continuity 
Management 
  Perform Preinstallation Test 
Plan
Compliance   Define System Validation 
Test Plan 
   Perform Validation Test on 
Installed System 
   Finalize Operational Security 
Measures
   Routine Security Reporting 
and Analysis 
   Periodic Audit and 
Compliance Measures 
   Reevaluate Security 
Countermeasures 
   Work with Suppliers and 
Consultants 
   Participate in Industry 
Forums and Development 
Programs 
94. DISCUSSION – COMPARISON OF STANDARDS 
The standards considered in this report provide recommendations for information/control 
system security management for use by those responsible for initiating, implementing, or 
maintaining security in their organization. 
The Appendix compares the standards considered in this report. By examining the 
Appendix, it is possible to see which section of a particular standard addresses which 
recommendation. This comparison of the security standards was performed by identifying 
similar recommendations within the standards. 
The standards were examined and the recommendations that were stated in the standard 
were noted. International Standard ISO/IEC 17799 was used as the baseline because it is the 
starting point for other cyber security standards. Since all of the standards do not address the 
same recommendations, it is recognized that there will be areas where there are no comparisons. 
For example, the ICS-SPP is written as a normative specification in the “Common Criteria” 
format. It primarily addresses system components. The ISA Technical Reports are informative in 
nature and are addressed to securing systems. The ISO/IEC standard considers the network, 
operating system, and application separately, and addresses recommendations such as passwords 
for each of these individually. This required the author’s judgment in defining areas of 
comparison. 
10
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This report reviews and compares the recommendations provided in three cross-sector 
cyber security standards to ISO/IEC 17799. There are distinct differences in the topics 
considered by these standards. Through a careful examination of this comparison, and of the 
standards presented here, this report can be used to help identify and reduce the vulnerabilities in 
a control system. By knowing the vulnerabilities, standards can be applied to control systems to 
minimize the risk of intrusion. 
Cyber security standards can provide increased security to control systems by giving an 
understanding of areas of concern and how they can be addressed. Although the three standards 
that were compared to the international information security standard were developed 
specifically for industries using manufacturing and control systems, they may be applied to other 
critical infrastructure segments or sectors. By comparing and sharing standards information 
across sectors, all sectors may benefit.
12
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Appendix
Security Standards Comparison
Requirement 
ISO/IEC 
17799 ICS-SPP TR99-01 TR99-02 
SECURITY POLICY 3 2, 7.1.2.3   6 
Information security policy. 3.1 2.2 7.1.3, 
7.1.6, 8.4, 
9.1.3 
Information security policy document. 3.1.1 2.3 (Table 2)   6.3, 6.4 
Review and evaluation of information security 
policy. 
3.1.2 3.1; Table 3   6.6.10 
VULNERABILITY AND RISK ASSESSMENT   3, 4, 7, and 8   6.6.5, 9 
Conduct a risk assessment. 7.1.1, 7.1.5, 
7.2.5, 7.2.6, 
9.4.3, 9.7.2.1, 
10.2, 10.3.1, 
10.3.2, 11.1.2 
3.2.1.2; 4; 
and Tables 5, 
6, 8, 10, 
7.2.1.3, 7.3.2 
8.5.1 9.1 
Three layer analysis.   7.1.2.1     
Security architecture analysis.   3.2.1.2.1, 
Table 5, 
7.1.2 
  9.1.3 
Successive compromise analysis.       9.1.3 
Quantitative risk analysis.   4   9.1.3 
Qualitative risk analysis.   7.2.1.3.1   9.1.3 
Risk management process.   7.2.1   10.1 
Mitigation program.    2.3 (Table 2)   10.1.1 
Equipment backup.   2.2 (Table 1); 
2.3 (Table 2) 
    
General considerations for conducting a risk and 
vulnerability assessment. 
  4.1 (Table 
10); 6.2.9, 
7.2.1.3, 
7.3.1.3 
    
ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY 4 2.2, 3.3; 
Table 9, 5.1 
Table 11, 
6.1.16,  
  6 
Information security infrastructure. 4.1 5.1; Table 11   6 
Management information security forum. 4.1.1     6.1 
Information security coordination (within the 
organization). 
4.1.2 5.1; Table 11   6.3.1 
18
Requirement 
ISO/IEC 
17799 ICS-SPP TR99-01 TR99-02 
Allocation of information security responsibilities 
(for assets and processes including leadership and 
management).  
4.1.3     6.3.1 
Authorization process for new information 
processing facilities. 
4.1.4     6.1 
Specialist information security advice. 4.1.5       
Cooperation between (external) organizations. 4.1.6     6.6.3 
Respond to disclosures of sensitive information.         
Independent review of information security. 4.1.7       
Staffing an InfoSec team.       6.3.1 
Security of third party access. 4.2     6.6.8.2.7 
Identification of risks from third party access. 4.2.1 2.2   7 
Types of access (physical or logical). 4.2.1.1 3.1, 5.1 
Table 11  
    
Reasons for access. 4.2.1.2       
On-site contractors. 4.2.1.3       
Security requirements in third party contracts. 4.2.2       
Outsourcing. 4.3       
Security requirements in outsourcing contracts. 4.3.1       
ASSET CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROL 5 3.2.1.3; 
Table 7; 
7.3.1.2 
  6.4 
Accountability for assets. 5.1 7.3.1.2   6.4, 8 
Inventory of assets. 5.1.1 7.3.1.2 10.1.6 9.1.1, 
9.1.2 
Information classification. 5.2   10.2 9.1.2.1 
Classification guidelines. 5.2.1     9.1.3 
Information labeling and handling. 5.2.2     6.6.8.4 
PERSONNEL SECURITY 6   10.2   
Security in job definition and resourcing. 6.1 3.3, Table 9 10.2 6.1 
Including security in job responsibilities. 6.1.1   10.2.1   
Personnel (background) screening and policy. 6.1.2   10.2   
Confidentiality agreements. 6.1.3       
Terms and conditions of employment. 6.1.4   10.2.1   
Identify personnel granted physical or electronic 
access.
  6.1.6, 6.1.7 3   
Job responsibilities.     10.2   
User training. 6.2 3.3, Table 9; 
6.2.3, 6.2.5 
10.2 4 
19
Requirement 
ISO/IEC 
17799 ICS-SPP TR99-01 TR99-02 
Information security education, training, and 
awareness.  
6.2.1 3.3, Table 9; 
6.2, Table 
13; 6.2.3 
10.2.1 4, 6.4 
Responding to security incidents and malfunctions. 6.3 6.1.21   18.13 
Incident reporting mechanisms. 6.3.1       
Reporting software malfunction. 6.3.3       
Learning from incidents. 6.3.4     18.12 
PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
SECURITY 
7 6.1.20 9.1.4, 10 6.6.4, 
6.6.8.3 
Secure areas. 7.1   5.2.6   
Physical security perimeter. 7.1.1   7.4.2, 
10.1.2,
10.1.4,
10.1.6
6.2.2, 
6.6.8.3 
Monitoring physical access. 7.1.1 6.1.21 10.1.1, 
10.1.3,
10.1.5
6.6.4 
Physical entry controls. 7.1.2 6.1.11 10.1.6 6.6.4 
Securing offices, rooms, and facilities. 7.1.3 6.1.20 10.1.2   
Working in secure areas.  7.1.4       
Isolated delivery and loading areas. 7.1.5       
Intruder detection. 7.1.3.e 6.1.11 8.3, 
10.1.1
Equipment security. 7.2 6.1.14, 
7.3.1.2 
10.1.2 6.6.8.2.6, 
6.6.8.3 
Equipment siting and protection. 7.2.1   10.1.2   
Power supplies. 7.2.2     6.7.1 
Cabling security. 7.2.3     6.7.1 
Equipment maintenance. 7.2.4   10.2.2   
Security of equipment off-premises. 7.2.5       
Secure disposal or re-use of equipment. 7.2.6     6.6.8.4 
Utility security.       8.2.1 
Port security.       Annex A 
General controls (information and information 
processing facilities).  
7.3       
Clear desk and clear screen policy. 7.3.1   10.1.6   
Removal of property. 7.3.2       
COMMUNICATIONS AND OPERATIONS 
MANAGEMENT 
8 6.1.18, 6.1.19   6.6.8.4 
Operational procedures and responsibilities. 8.1     6.6.8.4 
Documented operating procedures. 8.1.1   8.3.3?   
20
Requirement 
ISO/IEC 
17799 ICS-SPP TR99-01 TR99-02 
Operational change control. 8.1.2   5.1.1?, 
6.1.4? 
Incident management procedures. 8.1.3   8.1, 
10.2.1
Segregation of duties. 8.1.4       
Separation of development and operational 
facilities.
8.1.5     12.1 
External facilities management.  8.1.6       
Testing and documentation procedure.     8.3.3   
System planning and acceptance. 8.2     6.6.8.4 
Capacity planning. 8.2.1       
System acceptance.  8.2.2       
Protection against malicious software. 8.3   8.2 6.6.8.4 
Operating status monitoring.     8.5.2   
Housekeeping. 8.4     6.6.8.4 
Information back-up. 8.4.1       
Operator logs. 8.4.2       
Fault logging. 8.4.3       
Network management. 8.5   5.2.2, 
8.5.2 
6.6.8.1, 
6.6.8.4 
Network controls. 8.5.1       
Media handling and security. 8.6   10.1.2, 
10.2 
6.6.8.4 
Management of removable computer media. 8.6.1   10.1.2 6.6.8.4 
Disposal of media.  8.6.2, 7.2.6   10.1.2, 
10.1.6
6.6.8.4 
Information handling procedures. 8.6.3   10.1.2 6.6.8.4 
Information protection.     10.1.2   
Security of system documentation. 8.6.4     6.6.8.4 
File Transfer Protocol.     3.1, 6.1   
Information distribution.     5.3.3   
Exchanges of information and software. 8.7     6.6.8.4 
Information and software exchange agreements. 8.7.1       
Security of media in transit. 8.7.2       
Electronic commerce security.  8.7.3       
Security of electronic mail: security risks and policy 
on electronic mail. 
8.7.4, 8.7.4.1, 
8.7.4.2 
  6.1.4, 
9.1.4 
Security of electronic office systems. 8.7.5       
Publicly available systems.  8.7.6       
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Other forms of information exchange.  8.7.7       
ACCESS CONTROL 9 6.1.1, 6.1.7 6 6.6.8.2 
Business requirements for access control. 9.1 6.1.7 8.2.4, 
10.1.6,
10.2.1
Access control policy. 9.1.1 6.1.7 5.1   
Policy and business requirements. 9.1.1.1 6.1.7     
Access control rules. 9.1.1.2 6.1.1, 6.1.7     
User access management. 9.2 6.1.1 5.1.1 6.6.8.2.1 
User registration.  9.2.1 6.1.1   6.6.8.2.1 
Privilege management. 9.2.2 6.1.1 5.1.1 6.6.8.2.1 
Authentication (field devices).     5   
User password management. 9.2.3 6.1.2 5.2.6   
Review of user access rights. 9.2.4       
User responsibilities. 9.3 6.1, Table 12   6.6.8.2.2 
Password use. 9.3.1 6.1.2, 6.1.3, 
6.1.4, 6.1.5, 
6.1.6 
  6.6.8.2.2 
Unattended user equipment (protection).  9.3.2 6.1.5   6.6.8.2.2 
Network access control. 9.4   5 6.6.8.2.3 
Policy on use of network services. 9.4.1     6.6.8.2.3 
Enforced path. 9.4.2     6.6.8.2.3 
Securing remote access.    6.1.22, 
6.1.23, 6.1.24 
9.1.3   
User authentication for external connections. 9.4.3 6.1.22, 
6.1.23, 6.1.24 
  6.6.8.2.3 
Connections to the internet.     7.1.1, 
7.1.4 
6.6.8.2.7 
VPN Access.     7.4.2 Annex A 
Node authentication. 9.4.4       
Remote diagnostic port protection. 9.4.5       
Segregation in networks (firewalls). 9.4.6 6.1.9     
Network connection control. 9.4.7       
Network routing control.  9.4.8       
Electronic access controls.     6.1   
Operating system access control. 9.5 6, 6.1.1-6.1.6  5.2.4, 
6.2.4, 
6.3.5 
6.6.8.2.4 
Automatic terminal identification. 9.5.1 6.1.1   6.6.8.2.4 
Terminal log-on procedures. 9.5.2 6.1.1   6.6.8.2.4 
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User identification and authentication. 9.5.3 6.1.1   6.6.8.2.4 
Password management system. 9.5.4 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 
6.1.3, 6.1.4, 
6.1.5, 6.1.6 
5 6.6.8.2.4 
Use of system utilities. 9.5.5   5.8 6.6.8.2.4 
Duress alarm to safeguard users. 9.5.6     6.6.8.2.4 
Terminal time-out. 9.5.7     6.6.8.2.4 
Limitation of connection time. 9.5.8     6.6.8.2.4 
Application access control. 9.6     6.6.8.2.5 
Information access restriction. 9.6.1     6.6.8.2.5 
Sensitive system isolation. 9.6.2     6.6.8.2.5 
Monitoring system access and use. 9.7   3.1, 5.5.3, 
6.1, 6.2, 8 
6.6.8.2.6 
Event logging. 9.7.1 6.1.21   6.6.8.2.6 
Monitoring system use/access. 9.7.2 6.1.21 8.1 6.6.8.2.6
Procedures (for monitoring use including intrusion 
detection systems) and areas of risk.  
9.7.2.1 7.2, 7.2.1     
Review results of monitoring activities based on risk 
factors.
9.7.2.2 8.1, 8.1.1 8.1   
Logging and reviewing events (emphasis on 
review). 
9.7.2.3   8.2, 8.3   
Clock synchronization. 9.7.3       
Mobile computing and teleworking considerations. 9.8, 9.8.1, 
9.8.2 
  5.3.2, 
7.4.2, 
9.1.3 
6.6.8.2.7 
Field Device Access     9.2.2 6.6.8.1 
Authentication.     5.7   
Physical security.     10.1.2   
SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT AND 
MAINTENANCE 
10 6, 6.1 Table 
12
  6.6.9 
Systems management policies and procedures.       4 
New systems and significant changes to existing 
systems must use information security test 
procedures. 
      6.6.9, 6.7, 
18.3 
Security in application systems. 10.2   9 6.5 
Input data validation. 10.2.1       
Control of internal processing. 10.2.2       
Areas of risk. 10.2.2.1   9.1.3, 
9.2.3, 
9.3.3 
Checks and controls. 10.2.2.2       
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Message authentication. 10.2.3       
Output data validation. 10.2.4       
Cryptographic controls. 10.3   7   
Policy on the use of cryptographic controls. 10.3.1   7.1, 7.2, 
7.3, 7.4 
Annex A 
Encryption. 10.3.2   7 10.2.3 
Digital signatures considerations. 10.3.3   7.2   
Non-repudiation services. 10.3.4   7.2.4   
SCADA Cryptographic system component 
requirements.
    7.2   
Management components.     7.2   
Cryptographic module components.     7.1, 7.2   
SCADA Communication channel encryption 
components. 
    7.1, 7.2   
SCADA Cryptographic system design goals.     7.4   
Key management. 10.3.5   7.1   
Protection of cryptographic keys. 10.3.5.1   7.1.6   
Standards, procedures, and methods. 10.3.5.2       
Security of system files. 10.4       
Control of operational software. 10.4.1       
Protection of system test data. 10.4.2       
Access control to program source library. 10.4.3       
Security in development and support processes. 10.5   9 6.6.9 
Change control procedures. 10.5.1     18.3 
Technical review of operating system changes. 10.5.2       
Restrictions on changes to software packages. 10.5.3       
Outsourced software development considerations. 10.5.5       
Security patch management.     9.1.4 12.1 
BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT 11 3.3, Table 9, 
5.1 Table 11 
    
Aspects of business continuity management. 11.1 5.1 Table 11     
Business continuity management process. 11.1.1 5.1 Table 11     
Business continuity and impact analysis. 11.1.2 5.1 Table 11     
Writing and implementing continuity plans. 11.1.3 5.1 Table 11     
Business continuity planning framework 
(consistency of plans). 
11.1.4 5.1 Table 11     
Testing, maintaining, and re-assessing business 
continuity plans. 
11.1.5,
11.1.5.1-
11.1.5.2
5.1 Table 11     
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COMPLIANCE 12       
SCADA System Compliance Requirements.   1.2, 7.1   18.7 
Compliance monitoring process (compliance with 
standard). 
      20 
        8.2.1 
Compliance with legal requirements. 12.1   8.2.4   
Identification of applicable legislation. 12.1.1       
Intellectual property rights: copyright, software 
copyright. 
12.1.2,
12.1.2.1-
12.1.2.2
      
Safeguarding of organizational records.  12.1.3       
Data protection and privacy of personal information. 12.1.4 5.1 Table 11     
Prevention of misuse of information processing 
facilities.
12.1.5       
Regulation of cryptographic controls. 12.1.6       
Collection of evidence: rules for evidence, 
admissibility of evidence, quality of evidence. 
12.1.7,
12.1.7.1-
12.1.7.3
      
Reviews of security policy and technical 
compliance.
12.2 5.1 Table 11 6.1.6 6.6.8 
Compliance with security policy (auditing). 12.2.1 5.1 Table 11 6.1.6 18.15.1 
Technical compliance checking. 12.2.2 5.1 Table 11   18 
System audit considerations. 12.3 6.1.10, 
6.1.12, 6.1.13 
8 20 
System audit controls. 12.3.1       
Protection of system audit tools. 12.3.2   8.1   
Post-implementation auditing.     8.2, 8.3, 
8.4, 8.5 
Recursive auditing.     8.2, 8.3, 
8.4, 8.5 
